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Smith v. Howard County: 
Permanent Injunction 
Against "Chilling" 
Fifth Amendment Rights 
I
n 1974, the Maryland General As-
sembly enacted the Law-Enforcement 
Officers' Bill of Rights_ l "The pur-
pose of LEOBOR was to guarantee to 
those law-enforcement officers embraced 
therein procedural safeguards during in-
vestigation and hearing of matters con-
cerned with disciplinary action against the 
officer. ... In enacting the LEOBOR, the 
Legislature vested in law-enforcement of-
ficers certain 'rights' not available to the 
general public." 2 Section 728(b) of the 
LEOBOR establishes procedural safeguards 
for law-enforcement officers under inves-
tigation or subject to interrogation. Sec-
tion 733 prohibits actual or threatened 
punitive personnel action for the exercise 
or demand of rights under the LEOBOR 
or constitutional rights. 
by Professor Byron L. Warnken 
In Smith v. Howard County, 3 the Howard 
County Police Department alleged that 
Officer Harry Smith used a cassette tape 
recorder to tape a conversation between 
himself and one of his superior officers. 
He was formally notified that he was under 
investigation for this alleged conduct and 
was ordered to answer questions. Officer 
Smith was told that his failure to answer 
questions could result in the commence-
ment of an action leading to punitive meas-
ures in the form of sanctions up through 
and including dismissal. 
Officer Smith sought and obtained an ex 
parte temporary injunction against the Po-
lice Department from taking or threaten-
ing to take punitive personnel action in 
return for his exercise of his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against compelled self-
incnmmation or his rights under the 
LEOBOR. In the subsequent hearing con-
cerning a permanent injunction, the Po-
lice Department took the position that 
(1) injunctive equitable relief was not the 
appropriate remedy, (2) the right to be a 
police officer is dependent upon a willing-
ness to forego constitutional rights, (3) Of-
ficer Smith would only be subjected to de-
partmental disciplinary action and would 
not be subjected to criminal charges, and 
(4) any answers that he was forced to pro-
vide would be inadmissible in any criminal 
proceeding under the LEOBOR. Chief 
Judge Guy J. Cicone of the Circuit Court 
for Howard County rejected the arguments 
of the defendant and permanently enjoined 
the Police Department from taking or 
threatening any punitive personnel action 
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against Officer Smith as a result of the as-
sertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination. 
The Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination was made 
applicable against the states through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1964.4 The following year, 
in Griffin v. California,s the Supreme 
Court held that a "chilling effect" upon 
the exercise of the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination is just as much a 
constitutional violation as actually com-
pelling self-incriminating testimony. The 
Court prohibited both jury instructions 
and prosecutorial comment that permit 
the drawing of a negative inference from a 
defendant's silence, exercised in Onffin 
through an election not to testify. "[C]om-
ment on the refusal to testify ... is a pen-
alty imposed by the courts for exercising 
a constitutional privilege. It cuts down 
on the privilege by making its assertion 
costly." 6 
Two years ~fter Griffin, the Supreme 
Court decided the companion cases of 
Garrity v. New Jersey 7 and Spevak v. 
Klein. 8 In Garrity, police officers were in-
terrogated for an alleged conspiracy to ob-
struct the administration of traffic laws. 
They were informed that, although they 
had a right not to answer, if they exercised 
their right to remain silent, they would be 
subject to removal from office. The offi-
cers answered the questions, their answers 
were admitted into evidence in their sub-
sequent criminal trials on conspiracy 
charges, and they were convicted. The Su-
preme Court framed the issue as ''whether 
a State, contrary to the requirement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, can use the threat 
of discharge to secure incriminating evi-
dence against an employee."9 The Court 
held that the statements were coerced in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against compelled self-incrimination. 
The Court emphasized that police officers 
"are not relegated to a watered-down ver-
sion of constitutional rights [and] a State 
may not condition [the exercise of a consti-
tutional right] by the exaction of a price." 10 
In sum, "[ t ]he option [presented to the po-
lice officers] to lose their means of liveli-
hood or to pay the penalty of self-incrim-
ination is the antithesis of free choice to 
speak out or remain silent." 11 In Holloway 
v. State,12 the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland noted that statements controlled 
by Garrity are involuntary as a matter of 
law. In Widomski v. Chief of Police of Balti-
more City,13 the court recognized that Gar-
n'ty, as applied in Holloway, would pro-
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hibit ordering a police officer, under threat 
of disciplinary action, to take a polygraph 
test, 
In the companion case to Gam'ty, Spevak 
v. Klein,14 the Supreme Court followed 
the Gam'ty analysis, holding that a state 
cannot disbar an attorney because of the 
refusal to testify at a judicial inquiry. The 
Court posited that an individual cannot 
enjoy the constitutionally guaranteed un-
fettered exercise of the right to remain si-
lent if there may be a penalty for asserting 
that right. "[T]hreat is indeed as powerful 
an instrument of compulsion as the use of 
legal process to force from lips ... the evi-
dence necessary to convict .... " 15 





'rights' not available 
to the general 
public. " 
The year after Garrity-Spevak, the Su-
preme Court decided the companion cases 
of Gardner v. Broderick l6 and Uniformed 
Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Commission 
of Sanitation. 17 In Gardner, a police officer 
was advised of his constitutional rights 
and further advised that, if he did not 
waive his right and waive immunity from 
prosecution, he would be fired. He refused 
to waive his constitutional rights and was 
discharged solely for that refusal. Recog-
nizing that the facts in Gardner went be-
yond those in Garrity, the Court framed 
the issue as ''whether a policeman who re-
fuses to waive the protections which the 
privilege guarantees him may be dismissed 
from office because of that refusal." 18 The 
Court found Garrity controlling and re-
versed the appellate court's affirmance of 
the trial court's dismissal of the officer's 
petition for reinstatement. The Court's ra-
tionale was articulated as follows: 
He was discharged from office not for 
failure to answer relevant questions 
about his official duties, but for refusal 
to waive a constitutional right. He was 
dismissed for failure to relinquish the 
protections of the privilege against 
self-incrimination .... 
[T]he mandate of the great privilege 
against self-incrimination does not tol-
erate the attempt, regardless of its ulti-
mate effectiveness, to coerce a waiver 
of the immunity it confers on penalty 
of the loss of employment. It is clear 
that petitioner's testimony was de-
manded ... in part so that it might be 
used to prosecute him, and not solely 
for the purpose of securing an account-
ing of his performance of his public 
trust. If the latter had been the only 
purpose, there would have been no 
reason to seek to compel petitioner to 
waive his immunity. 19 
In DiGrazia v. County Executive for 
Montgomery County,20 the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland held that even a police 
chief who was a political appointee, and 
who therefore could be replaced by an-
other appointee within the absolute dis-
cretion of the county executive, could not 
be terminated because of the exercise of 
his constitutional rights. The court quoted 
from Mt. Healthy City Board of Education 
v. Doyle,21 wherein the Supreme Court 
stated: "The constitutional principle at 
stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an 
employee is placed in no worse a position 
than ifhe had not engaged in the conduct. 
A borderline or marginal candidate should 
not have the employment question re-
solved against him because of constitu-
tionally protected conduct." 22 
In the companion case to Gardner, Uni-
formed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Com-
mission of Sanitation,23 fifteen sanitation 
workers were discharged, twelve because 
of their assertion of the constitutional priv-
ilege against compelled self-incrimination 
and three because of their refusal to waive 
immunity from prosecution. The Court 
made the following factual finding, upon 
which it based its holding. 
Petitioners were not discharged 
merely for refusal to account for their 
conduct as employees of the city. They 
were dismissed for invoking and refus-
ing to waive their constitutional right 
against self-incrimination. They were 
discharged for refusal to expose them-
selves to criminal prosecution based 
on testimony which they would give 
under compulsion, despite their con-
stitutional privilege. 24 
Relying upon Garrity and Gardner, the 
Court reversed the judgment that had af-
firmed the dismissal of their action for a 
declaratory judgment and for injunctive 
relief. 
The final relevant Supreme Court au-
thority is Lefkowitz v. Turley,25 in which 
architects were disqualified from public 
contracts because of their refusal to waive 
their privilege against compelled self-
incrimination and their refusal to waive 
immunity from prosecution, both with re-
spect to their governmental transactions. 
The Court declared that Garrity, Gardner 
and Sanitation Men were controlling, stat-
ing that a "waiver secured under threat of 
substantial economic sanction cannot be 
termed voluntary."26 The Court added 
that if a governmental agency needs the in-
formation to the point of compelling testi-
mony, the State must provide both im-
munity and the power of the courts to 
compel testimony, after a grant of immu-
nity, through civil contempt proceedings. 27 
In Smith v. Howard County,28 the con-
duct for which Officer Smith was required 
to report and answer questions was the 
alleged cassette tape recording of a conver-
sation between himself and a superior offi-
cer. The alleged conduct is criminal under 
section 10-402 of the Maryland Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings Code Annotated. 29 
Subsection (a) prohibits the interception, 
disclosure or use of certain wire or oral 
communication. Subsection (b) establishes 
that the offense is a felony, subject to five 
years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. 
Officer Smith was not charged with a vio-
lation of any departmental regulation and 
the alleged conduct does not violate any 
departmental regulation. Thus, the charge 
could only be brought, and the unrefuted 
testimony was that it was brought, solely 
by virtue of the felony criminal statute. 
Consequently, Officer Smith's counsel in-
formed the Police Department that his 
client would appear as required, but would 
assert his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination. The 
response of the Police Department was 
that Officer Smith's failure to answer ques-
tions "could result in commencement of an 
action which may lead to punitive meas-
ures" in the form of sanctions up through 
and including dismissal. 
The defendant relied upon two cases in 
an attempt to counter the plaintiff's con-
stitutional argument. The first case, Chris-
tal v. Police Commissioner of San Fran-
ciSCO,30 was relied upon for the proposition 
that the right of a police officer to keep his 
or her job is dependent upon the officer's 
willingness to forego constitutional rights. 
Officer Smith argued that this 1939 Cali-
fornia intermediate appellate opinion was 
handed down, without reliance upon Su-
preme Court authority, twenty-five years 
before the Fifth Amendment was incorpo-
rated against the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and twenty-six years before the first 
of the six Supreme Court decisions, which 
together established the sanctity of the 
right to the unfettered exercise of his priv-
ilege against compelled self-incrimination. 
The other case, Nichols v. Baltimore Po-
lice Department,3l was relied upon by the 
defendant as dispositive of the self-incrim-
ination issue. Officer Smith, on the other 
hand, argued that the issue before the 
court was controlled by the Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. In Nichols, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland addressed 
only the limited issue of the meaning of 
selection 728(b)(lO) of the LEOBOR, de-
termining the extent to which a police of-
ficer and his or her representative may 
consult in order to enter objections to a 
question asked by an interrogator. Chief 
Judge Gilbert, writing for the court, stated 
the obvious-that the legislature, in enact-
ing the LEOBOR, could not have pro-
vided less rights than the supreme law of 
the land embodied in the Constitution. 32 
The General Assembly likewise recognized 
this when it enacted section 733 as part of 
the LEOBOR. 
A law-enforcement officer may not 
be discharged, demoted, or denied pro-
motion, transfer, or reassignment, or 
otherwise discriminated against in re-
gard to his employment or be threat-
ened with any such treatment, by rea-
son of his exercise of or demand for the 
rights granted in this subtitle, or by 
reason of the lawful exercise of his 
constitutional rights. 33 
The plaintiff further argued that the 
case before the court was distinguishable 
from Nichols and that there was nothing in 
Nichols that conflicted with either the Su-
preme Court's decisions or the plaintiff's 
position. In Nichols, ChiefJudge Gilbert, 
in analyzing subsection (b)(lO) of section 
728, stated that it was 
concerned solely with investigations or 
interrogations involving possible vio-
lations of non-criminal department pol-
icies. Otherwise, the full panoply of 
Miranda would be applicable, and sub-
section 728(b)(lO) would be mere sur-
plusage, since Miranda is founded on 
the supreme law of the land, the Con-
stitution of the United States. Conse-
quently, any attempt by State law to 
restrict Miranda's application would 
be futile. 34 
Not only did Chief] udge Gilbert hold that 
the lone subsection before the court ad-
dressed only "non-criminal departmental 
policies," he found that the complaint 
against Officer Nichols was that he " 'shirked 
... [his] responsibilities,''' 35 and thus the 
"interrogation is, in appellant's case, strictly 
non-criminal." 36 It was in this context that 
Chief Judge Gilbert wrote the language 
upon which the defendant relied. 
The commander may order the officer 
to answer the question, and if that or-
der is refused, the officer in all likeli-
hood faces a charge of disobeying the 
commander's direct order. Dismissal 
from the department is a possible, if 
not probable, product of the disobedi-
ence. In short, the officer, confronted 
by not answering a question or dis-
obeying a direct order of his or her 
commander, is placed in the position 
of choosing between facing a tiger or 
facing a lion. Either choice might 
prove fatal to the officer's career in 
law-enforcement. 37 
Officer Smith argued that this language 
was inapplicable to the investigation of 
him for alleged felonious conduct and that 
it merely restated, in other words, the 
teachings of the Supreme Court, particu-
larly that provided in Gardner v. Broder-
ick. 38 If the sole purpose of an investiga-
tion is an accounting of job performance, 
without any potential criminality, then, 
and only then, is an order to answer ques-
tions, under threat of loss of job, consti-
tutionally permissible. The purely non-
criminal context of ChiefJudge Gilbert's 
language in Nichols is demonstrated by his 
follow-up statement. ''Notwithstanding the 
degree of difficulty which the officer faces 
when put to a Hobson's choice, the Legis-
lature never intended to permit an officer, 
under investigation for such non-criminal 
matters, to stifle the interrogation or inves-
tigation to the point where it is for all prac-
tical purposes non-existent." 39 
In granting the permanent injunction in 
Smith v. Howard County, Chief Judge 
Cicone appeared unpersuaded, particularly 
in light of the plaintiff's uncontraverted 
evidence, by the defendant's assertion that 
it considered this matter purely non-crim-
inal, departmental and administrative in 
nature. In any event, the assertion by the 
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Police Department that it considered the 
investigation non-criminal would not be 
controlling. An individual may refuse "to 
answer official questions put to him in any 
... proceeding, civil or criminal, formal 
or informal, when the answers might in-
criminate him in future criminal proceed-
ings." 40 As long as there is potential for 
criminal charges arising from the conduct, 
the right to remain silent is absolute. U n-
less there has been a constitutionally suffi-
cient grant of immunity,41 the person be-
ing interrogated is, effectively, the final 
authority of the applicability of the right to 
remain silent.42 
The Law-Enforcement Officers' 
Bill of Rights 
It is ironic that, when a Police Depart-
ment interrogates one of its officers, under 
threat of punitive disciplinary action for 
refusal to answer questions, the Law-
Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights could 
be argued to afford the officer less rights 
than would otherwise be available. First, 
as Chief] udge Gilbert recognized in Nich-
ols v. Baltimore Police Department,43 the 
Constitution of the United States controls 
over the LEOBOR.44 Second, the express 
language of the LEOBOR provides that 
"[a] law-enforcement officer may not be 
... threatened with [discharge or other ad-
verse personnel action] by reason of his ex-
ercise of ... his constitutional rights."45 
Thus, both the Fifth Amendment and the 
LEOBOR preclude threatened or actual 
penalty for assertion of the right to remain 
silent. Third, the legislature, in enacting 
the LEOBOR in 1974, intended to pro-
vide more rights - not less - to police offi-
cers under investigation. "The purpose of 
the LEOBOR was to guarantee to those 
law-enforcement officers embraced therein 
procedural safeguards during investiga-
tion .... In enacting the LEOBOR, the 
Legislature vested in law-enforcement offi-
cers certain 'rights' not available to the gen-
eral public." 46 Fourth, section 728 (b)(7)(i) 
of the LEOBOR provides that "[t]he law-
enforcement officer under interrogation 
may not be threatened with transfer, dis-
missal or disciplinary action." 47 
Notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment 
and the language of the LEOBOR just 
presented, section 728 (b)(7)(ii) provided 
the other basis for the defendant's argu-
ment in Smith v. Howard County. That 
section reads in part: 
This subtitle does not prevent any 
law-enforcement agency from requir-
ing a law-enforcement officer under 
investigation to submit to ... interro-
gations which specifically relate to the 
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subject matter of the investigation. 
This subtitle does not prevent a law-
enforcement agency from commencing 
any action which may lead to a puni-
tive measure as a result of a law-en-
enforcement officer's refusal to submit 
to ... interrogation, after having been 
ordered to do so by the law-enforce-
ment agency. 48 
The defendant argued that subsection 
(b)(7)(ii) supports the position that a po-
lice officer must answer potentially incrim-
inating questions or be subject to dismissal 
for the refusal to answer such questions. 
Officer Smith argued that, if that is what 
subsection (b)(7)(ii) means, then Garrity 
v. New Jersey49 and Gardner v. Broder-
ick 50 would render the statute unconstitu-
tional as applied in any situation, unless 
the questions related to matters with no 
potential for criminality. However, instead 
of arguing the unconstitutionality of sec-
tion 728 (b)(7)(ii), Officer Smith used prin-
ciples of statutory construction to recon-
cile it with the Fifth Amendment, with 
section 728 (b)(7)(i) and with section 733. 
First, as to the constitutionality of the 
statute, all statutes are presumed to be con-
stitutional. The legislature is presumed to 
be aware of existing law, which includes 
the United States Constitution. 51 The leg-
islature is presumed, in light of that knowl-
edge and the oath of office, to enact legis-
lation that is constitutional. If the legisla-
ture enacts a statute that is both plain on its 
face and unconstitutional, it must be struck 
down. 52 However, because of these pre-
sumptions, if there is any ambiguity in the 
statute and there is any reading of the stat-
ute that will render it constitutional, it 
must be so interpreted. 53 
Second, as to the reconciliation of 
subsection 728 (b)(7)(ii) with subsection 
728 (b)(7)(i), as well as with section 733, 
statutes must be read as a whole. 54 No 
statute should be read in such a manner as 
to render any portion of it superfluous, 
meaningless or nugatory. 55 When inter-
preting the LEOBOR, the determination of 
the constitutionality of subsection (b )(7)(ii), 
as well its reconciliation with the remainder 
of the statute, both produce the same re-
sult. The first step is to eliminate what 
subsection (b)(7)(ii) does not mean; the 
second step is to discover what it does 
mean. 
Subsection (b)(7)(ii) does not provide 
any police department with the authority 
to take or threaten punitive personnel ac-
tion in return for the assertion of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination. First, Garrity and Gard-
ner make any such action unconstitutional. 
Second, section 728 (b)(7)(i) provides that 
"[t]he law-enforcement officer under inter-
rogation may not be threatened with trans-
fer, dismissal, or disciplinary action." 56 
Third, section 733 provides that "[a] law-
enforcement officer may not be [subjected 
to punitive personnel action] or be threat-
ened with any such treatment, by reason of 
his exercise of or demand for the rights 
granted in this subtitle, [e.g., the right not 
to be threatened under section 728 (b) (7)(i) ] 
or by reason of the lawful exercise of his 
constitutional rights, [e.g., the right against 
compelled self-incrimination under the 
Fifth Amendment]." 57 Thus, to read sub-
section (b)(7)(ii) as authorizing threatened 
or actual dismissal for assertion of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege would not only be 
unconstitutional, it would "write out" of 
the statute subsection (b)(7)(i). 
Officer Smith argued that there is only 
one possible reading of section 728 (b)(7)(ii) 
that renders it consistent with section 
728 (b)(7)(i), with section 733 and with the 
Fifth Amendment. Subsection (b)(7)(i) 
provides that "[t]he law-enforcement offi-
cer under interrogation may not be threat-
ened with transfer, dismissal or disciplinary 
action."58 Subsection (b)(7)(ii) provides 
that "[t]his subtitle does not prevent a law-
enforcement agency from commencing any 
action which may lead to a punitive meas-
ure as a result of a law-enforcement offi-
cer's refusal to submit to ... interrogation, 
after having been ordered to do so by the 
law-enforcement agency."59 Thus, if a po-
lice department complies with all of the 
provisions of the LEOBOR, subsection 
(b)(7)(ii) authorizes it to require one of its 
officers to participate in an investigation 
and report for an interrogation session. 
This is consistent with the Fifth Amend-
ment. Only the defendant in a criminal 
trial may assert the ''blanket'' Fifth Amend-
ment privilege of refusing to even take the 
stand. In all other settings, the individual 
must submit to the interrogation process. 60 
However, even though the individual must 
submit to the interrogation process, he 
may refuse "to answer official questions 
put to him in any ... proceeding, civil or 
criminal, formal or informal, when the 
answers might incriminate him in future 
criminal proceedings." 61 The perfect anal-
ogy is the issuance of a grand jury sub-
poena. "Refusal to submit to interrogation" 
can result in incarceration for contempt of 
court. However, once "under interroga-
tion," the individual may assert, as to any 
and all questions, the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against compelled self-incrim-
ination. Subsection (b)(7) (i) recognizes 
that constitutional privilege, as well as the 
Supreme Court decisions precluding any 
threats that may create a "chilling effect" 
upon that privilege. 
The final argument presented by Offi-
cer Smith was in response to the following 
language in section 728 (b)(7)(ii). "The 
results of any ... interrogation, as may be 
required by the law-enforcement agency 
under this subtitle are not admissible or 
discoverable in any criminal proceedings 
against the law-enforcement officer when 
the law-enforcement officer has been or-
dered to submit." 62 He argued, and the 
defendant conceded, that this was not an 
immunity provision under which the Of-
fice of the State's Attorney could grant im-
munity and compel the testimony. 
There is no inherent or common law 
power of immunity. It exists only when 
the legislature (or the Constitution) ex-
pressly authorizes a grant of immunity. 63 
Maryland has only a few immunity stat-
utes, each limited to a particular offense 
that the legislature has found difficult to 
investigate and prosecute withOll.t the tes-
timony of those involved in the crime. 64 
Maryland does not have a general immu-
nity statute, and this is certainly not due 
to an oversight on the part of the legisla-
ture. At least five general immunity bills 
have failed in the General Assembly since 
1978.65 
There are three kinds of immunity. 
From most broad to most narrow, they are 
(1) transactional immunity, (2) use plus de-
rivative use immunity, and (3) use immu-
CCThis decision could 
affect the manner 
in which police 
departments 
throughout the 
State respect the 
constitutional rights 
of their officers." 
nity. "Transactional immunity" prohibits 
the prosecution of all criminal transactions 
about which the individual is compelled to 
testify. Almost all of Maryland's limited 
number of immunity statutes provide trans-
actional immunity. 66 "Use plus derivative 
use immunity" is the minimum needed to 
satisfy the Fifth Amendment by "giving" 
as much as it "takes away".67 Use plus de-
rivative use immunity "guarantees the com-
pelled witness not simply that his words 
will not be used against him directly, but 
also that they will not be used indirectly as 
leads to the development of derivative evi-
dence."68 Once a prosecutor gives a consti-
tutional grant of immunity, pursuant to an 
express immunity statute, "his only guar-
antees of adequate testimonial performance 
are the threat of contempt and the threat of 
perjury."69 Mere "use immunity", on the 
other hand, ~s constitutionally defective as 
a "trade off" to compel testimony in the 
face of an assertion of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against compelled self-incrimi-
nation. Use immunity merely guarantees 
that the compelled testimony will not be 
used against the compelled witness. 
There is nothing in section 728(b)(7)(ii) 
to permit reading it as an express grant of 
immunity by the legislature. If it did pro-
vide for a grant of immunity, it would be 
Maryland's first general immunity statute, 
applying to all crimes if the alleged perpe-
trator were a law-enforcement officer. The 
LEOBOR was designed to provide more 
rights-not less-to law-enforcement offi-
cers. If police officers are the only citizens 
upon whom immunity may be "forced" for 
all crimes, it is clear they would be receiv-
ing less rights than the average citizen, be-
cause immunity is "no favor" to the one 
immunized. 
Formal immunity is not necessarily the 
subject of a bargain and is frequently 
forced upon a reluctant witness against 
that witness's will. A witness is sum-
moned to testify at a trial or before 
a grand jury. The witness claims the 
privilege against compelled testimonial 
self-incrimination. The State, upon 
explicit statutory authorization, may 
then officially and upon the record 
confer a grant of the appropriate form 
of immunity upon the recalcitrant wit-
ness, whether that witness wishes it or 
not. 70 
Moreover, if section 728(b)(7Xii) were an 
immunity statute, it would permit enforce-
ment of a grant of immunity not simply by 
the judicially approved methods of threat 
of contempt and threat of perjury, but by a 
new threat, that of disciplinary action and 
loss of employment. 
In the alternative, Officer Smith argued 
that if section 728(b )(7Xii) is an immunity 
statute, it is unconstitutional, because it 
neither protects him from prosecution for 
any transaction for which his testimony is 
compelled, nor does it protect him from 
both the use of the statements as evidence 
and the use of the statements as leads to 
develop derivative evidence. Section 728 
(b)(7)(ii) is merely an exclusionary device, 
rendering his statements inadmissible as 
evidence, which is constitutionally insuffi-
cient to compel testimony from an individ-
ual desiring to exercise his unfettered Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent without 
penalty. 
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Conclusion 
Upon announcing in open court his order 
for a permanent injunction, Chief Judge 
Cicone noted that Officer Smith did not 
relinquish any of his constitutional privi-
leges by virtue of accepting employment 
as a Howard County Police Officer. Our 
society, which rightfully demands from 
our police officers that they not infringe 
upon our constitutional rights, must simi-
larly demand for our police officers that 
they receive their constitutional rights. 
Consider the following: (1) a superficial 
reading by police superiors and their legal 
advisers of certain language out of context, 
in either or both Nichols71 and section 
728(b)(7)(ii) of the LEOBOR,72 (2) the 
pari-military nature of any police force, 
(3) the ability to deprive an accused officer 
of his entitlement to future employment, 
and (4) the extent of interest and inquiry 
from attorneys throughout the State since 
the permanent injunction in Smith v. 
Howard County. This decision could af-
fect the manner in which police depart-
ments throughout the State respect the 
constitutional rights of their officers. 
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